Last month, we carried critical dispatches from the WSIS+20 High-Level Event, a pivotal moment in the lead-up to the WSIS+20 Overall Review by the UN General Assembly. We sat down with Nandini Chami, Deputy Director and Fellow-Research & Policy Engagement at IT for Change and a member of the Global Digital Justice Forum, for a deep dive into the stakes and opportunities at this crucial juncture in global digital governance.

Susan: In your dispatch from the WSIS+20 High-Level Event, you strongly challenged the dominant sentiment of optimism about multistakeholder collaboration as a solution to all digital governance issues, due to the overwhelming evidence of corporate interests dominating this space. But this multistakeholder model has also historically created space for progressive civil society action. Given the present context and the legacy of civil society’s role in the WSIS process, what were your expectations and apprehensions as we approached this year’s high-level event?

Nandini: The core expectation from where I stand, and with our work in the Global Digital Justice Forum, is that the WSIS process has to deliver on development outcomes. Since WSIS is the only instrument that we have to further an agenda of seizing the technological revolution for people-centered, human rights-based, and inclusive development.

One strong expectation is that we learn from the historical mistake of not committing to public financing for digital infrastructure development in the South, and assuming that the market will yield more dividends. That has not worked in the case of connectivity, and there is no reason why it should work in data and AI. We are much wiser now, and we know that when you leave the market to work in its laissez-faire way, digitalization benefits only a few companies and a few countries.

The WSIS must look into what can be done to mobilize public financing. I want to underline this fact because we are not talking about just a loose set of options, such as blended financing. How do we ensure the companies that have enriched themselves on the internet commons pay back to society and contribute to the digital pathways to development for the most marginalized?

We have proposals such as the Digital Development Tax, mentioned in the Secretary General’s Our Common Agenda report, where a share of profit would go into a common escrow-like fund used for digital development for all. We also have insights from other debates, such as climate, where people have been talking about solidarity levies for climate financing, where the polluters pay. So, in digitalization, why is it so hard to have this conversation? This is one expectation we have from WSIS.

The second expectation is that, after UN Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese’s reports on the role of Big Tech in facilitating the genocide in Palestine, there is no doubt that we cannot work in a neutral conduit or self-governance paradigm as far as Big Tech companies are concerned. What do we do to close the yawning human rights accountability deficit when it comes to the technological life cycle?

There has to be a concrete outcome on how to have a proper conversation at the global level in order to hold member states accountable for their obligation to address human rights abuses by their digital businesses in global technology value chains.

A new modality has been introduced – that of an informal multi-stakeholder sounding board that will advise the co-facilitators on each step they have to undertake in the process. There is a risk of mission creep if this group – intended to be a connector with an ear to the ground for specific constituencies – is expected to build consensus, as it could reinforce discursive hegemonies.

In terms of prognosis and what we expect, I think that in civil society, we never give up. We have to continue. It is up to all of us to get a positive outcome from WSIS and not give up too early, and to use all the channels we have to make member states hear our demands.

Susan: What is your analysis of the WSIS+20 High-Level Event 2025? How did your apprehensions play out? Did you feel these concerns were meaningfully addressed? Could you reflect on your experience?

Nandini: A week prior to the event, Francesca Albanese had released her fact-based and very damning report ‘From Economy of Occupation to an Economy of Genocide’ on the corporate machinery sustaining Israel’s settler-colonial project of displacement and replacement of the Palestinians in the occupied territory. There is absolutely no doubt that, by any impartial and objective standards, the evidence shows the facilitating role of US-based Big Tech corporations in the Palestinian genocide.

Irrespective of this, at the WSIS+20 High-Level Event, held in parallel with the AI for Good Summit, these companies shared the stage and had pride of place in the proceedings. We need to pause and reflect: who are we letting take the lead in the conversation? What does it mean when a UN body is saying something, but the rest of the system is unable to process it or critically reflect on corporate power? There is a particular problem here.

If corporations are not able to be held accountable for crucial moral violations, yet we still think they can set the agenda on directing the digital revolution for social good, there is a dissonance. To clarify, I am not talking about deplatforming. What I mean is that there is an uncritical celebration of multi-stakeholder action and the idea that the private sector can sit at the table as if there are no tensions between the profit imperative and the interests of the people. After something as significant as this report, how can we still go on with that naïve optimism and ignore the workings of these power structures?

Susan: Given that this dissonance seems to be a sort of normative blind spot within the process, how do we critically take stock of the WSIS multistakeholder model, even as it is heralded as a glowing standard for inclusive and democratic governance in any space where internet governance gets discussed? How can we address the democratic deficit in the multistakeholder model that has come to dominate international cooperation in the digital space?

Nandini: I think there are three issues that tend to get confused under the label of multistakeholderism, and this is why a conversation that seems to challenge the multi-stakeholder model usually gets derailed.

The first point is that, in global governance spaces, the fact that civil society should be in the room is something everyone recognizes. Typically, when you critique the way digital multistakeholderism has unfolded, others respond by asking, “Do you want digital governance to be like the WTO, where you don’t even know what text is being negotiated?” That is not what civil society critics of digital multistakeholderism are saying. What we are saying is that we have reached a situation in digital governance where we are no longer sure of who is representing whom, and whose interests are being represented by which actors. Multi-stakeholderism cannot mean that.

If our demand is that civil society should be in the room and civil society should be heard, then let us frame the demand that way. Let us not frame the demand as all stakeholders having an equal footing in the room. That is the first point.

The second point is that power works everywhere. When you talk about a multilateral process, like the Tobacco Convention, corporate power still came in under other hats—civil society or philanthropy—and took civil society’s space. No one is naïve about the ways power works. What is particularly concerning in digital multi-stakeholderism is that there is an active mechanism at work to prevent agenda framing.

If the idea of a multi-stakeholder model is that we all have dialogue, and dialogue is an end in itself, then the question is: how does dialogue lead to rule setting? This question is never answered. As a result, we live in a world with no rules for digital policy at a global level. There is no normative baseline, and we never address how to arrive at an institutional process for creating one.

The fact that we want multi-stakeholder dialogue is something I agree with; forums like the Internet Governance Forum, where dialogue happens, have value. But such dialogue cannot substitute an institutional process whereby public policy issues—which are the responsibility of states—are addressed. States must be informed through proper consultative, participatory, multi-constituency processes. This is something we need to recognize.

Finally, over 20 years ago, when we talked about multi-stakeholder governance in the context of the internet’s architecture, the important fact to remember is that ICANN worked in a particular way, and internet institutions operated through open-ended engagement and opt-in mechanisms. The voluntary labor of the technical community supported the diffuse global architecture on which the internet stands. That is one thing. But isn’t it unreasonable to say that the exact mechanism through which I manage the address book of the internet should be the way to decide all public policy issues in the future, whether they are about human rights, security, or data flows? This is a sleight of hand that gets misused by the status quo. We need to move away from the idea that institutional processes in internet-related public policy issues must remain frozen in the 2005 moment. This is not a realistic way to govern an economy where all the infrastructures of life are being digitalized.

Susan: In the space of global digital cooperation in the recent past, what were salient to you as striking developments? Was there a shift in discourse/tone, new framings, new coalitions in global digital governance? What opportunities and risks do you see on the horizon?

Nandini: One of the biggest positive developments, in my view, that has broken a global stalemate in relation to the lack of progress on governance of internet-related public policy issues is the UN Global Digital Compact. In 2024, member states were able to sit together and commit to a value-based digital cooperation with clear objectives. They also recognized that internet-related public policy issues today include data and AI governance, and that something needs to be done. We need institutional mechanisms. This is a great development, and we have to seize this opportunity.

Out of the Global Digital Compact, the CSTD-led working group on data governance, which is currently underway, is a golden opportunity to create a cross-cutting framework that brings together the economic and non-economic dimensions of data governance in an integrated manner. If done well, it will address a critical deficit in responding to the data neocolonialism challenge we are all facing, and it will expand the ambit of human rights conversations beyond “human rights online” to consider the full technology lifecycle. The Global Digital Compact provides a starting point for this.

In order to make good on these gains, it is important that the WSIS process pay attention to the framings in the Global Digital Compact and ensure that the Action Lines’ agenda is expanded in a way relevant to this data and AI moment. There should be an integrated implementation and review mechanism that connects the WSIS Action Lines with the Global Digital Compact, and also links the Financing for Development agenda for the SDGs with the goals of data and AI justice. These are areas where I see real promise.

But, as the Global Digital Justice Forum observed earlier this year, some concerns remain. One is the consolidation of a particular grammar of technology in our system, and the rise of a techno-oligarchy with enormous power to determine even the framing of democratic agendas. Today, if you want to amplify your voice and speak truth to power, the challenge is not censorship in the traditional sense—where your voice is silenced or your broadcast is cut off. Instead, there is a grammar of distraction, using algorithmic virality, where the powerful can shift attention from one crisis to the next. This prevents reflective agenda formation and the solidarity mobilization that are essential.

This is a deep concern. We no longer own the public sphere as civil society; the private sector owns the public sphere. What happens then? This is alarming, and it should give us sleepless nights, if it doesn’t.

Another risk is that trade agreements are being used to write new rules of the digital economy, taking away the ability of developing countries to generate revenue—whether through control of their data resources or the ability to tax corporations. Even though we have a UN model tax convention, if we negotiate away our rights to regulate transnational corporations through trade agreements, how will we even implement its optional protocols? This is rule-setting by brute force, or by sanctions, and we don’t know where it will lead.

There are, of course, moments of resistance, even from Southern countries challenging this paradigm—such as the BRICS Leaders’ Declaration on Artificial Intelligence, which asserts the right to data sovereignty and development autonomy as critical to shaping the AI paradigm, and to balancing the public interest with the innovation imperative in intellectual property, data, and AI. But we still have to see how these power struggles play out.

Susan: Earlier this year, commenting on the significance of the Global Digital Compact (GDC) and the imperatives of digital governance today, you had expressed “hope that the Global Digital Compact can, and will, pave the way for the world to move towards a human rights-based digital constitutionalism, marking the beginnings of a transparent, democratic, and people-centric digital governance process as envisioned in the WSIS Tunis Agenda.”  How would you link the WSIS HLE to the Global Digital Compact process? How are the processes influencing each other’s language and form? What is the trajectory that international cooperation is on?

Nandini: I think the good news is that everyone—institutions, civil society, and member states—recognizes that integrated implementation of the Global Digital Compact and WSIS is essential. This avoids duplication and ineffective ways of making progress.

What we really need is a framing where inequality and structural injustice are seen as urgent priorities. Instead of focusing only on inclusion, we must ask how to address the ways digital development often reinforces inequality. As studies by Research ICT Africa have shown, increasing connectivity and digital diffusion can actually deepen inequality rather than reduce it as the digital economy evolves.

So, how do we rectify inequality and differences in infrastructural capabilities between digital economy leaders and latecomers? How do we ensure that today’s conversations about technology transfer do not replicate the neocolonial patterns of the industrial era? These issues must be front and center.

There is growing recognition of this shift. Even five years ago, it would have been unthinkable to see terms like data justice and digital justice become common sense in global policy debates. Today, these ideas are firmly on the table, and developing country policymakers are paying close attention.

Much will depend on how the G77 is able to put forward a coherent agenda to make data and AI injustice the top priority and to ensure equitable distribution of infrastructural capabilities. There is no shortage of proposals. For example, UNCTAD has suggested creating a “CERN for public compute,” while the High-Level Advisory Board on AI has put forward proposals for integrated data and AI governance—most notably, a governance framework to equitably distribute the benefits of innovation through a data commons.

We are not short on ideas or out-of-the-box thinking. What we lack is the political will to implement them. Let’s hope we find it.

Susan: What were your key takeaways from reading the Chair’s summary after the conclusion of the High-Level Event? What is the significance of this document in relation to the current juncture of the struggle for digital justice? Are there any glaring absences? What priorities should we keep on the radar in the coming months before the WSIS+20 review in December?

Nandini: What we see in that event is a celebration of the grammar of multi-stakeholderism. Success is framed as the fact that there is so much dialogue, so many innovators coming together, and awards for the multi-stakeholder community progressing in their respective areas. There is also a lot of conversation about how we had the ICT for Development (ICTD) moment, now a data moment, and an AI moment—asking how the arc of innovation will take us forward in leapfrogging development problems.

All this is well and good, but the problem lies in two areas. First, as seen in the Chair’s Summary, there is a tendency to say that multi-stakeholderism has achieved a lot of progress, and if it becomes more inclusive, it will be even more successful. The problem is that multi-stakeholderism becomes an empty signifier. What does it really stand for? Is success measured simply by the number of voices, the number of people and countries represented? The Summary highlights presence and participation, but is presence enough? Is voice enough to translate into the right for demands to be heard? We don’t pause to reflect on the institutional governance deficit that prevents real agenda formation.

Second, in all the conversations about looking back at WSIS, the glaring silence is about challenging the naïve faith in private-sector-led innovation automatically leading to trickle-down benefits for everyone. This assumption is never challenged. For example, there was only one session across all the days that addressed the unfinished business of enhanced cooperation. There is reluctance to open up the agenda of institutional processes, governance deficits, or the lack of funding commitments for public infrastructure development. These uncomfortable conversations don’t happen. Instead, the focus remains on inclusion and dialogue, without asking whose agendas are being set, by whom, and through what processes. The hard issues are cast aside.

Right now, we have the elements paper, and we are still awaiting the zero draft of the outcome document. In my view, the first priority is a commitment to public financing of digital infrastructure, as I mentioned earlier. The second priority is a commitment to an institutional governance process—for example, whether the UN CSTD will conduct an annual review of WSIS implementation and take up outstanding issues. We highlighted this in our submission on the consultation of the elements paper. Finally, the third priority is corporate accountability for human rights, including a commitment to a global process to hold transnational corporations accountable.

Susan:  What, in your view, are the key imperatives for WSIS+20 review to deliver on digital justice?

Nandini: The Global Digital Justice Forum has prepared a Call to Action to highlight unfinished business from WSIS that needs urgent attention along four key agendas. The first agenda is human rights adequate to the digital paradigm. We need accountability for corporate violations and recognition of the state’s extraterritorial duty to hold home corporations accountable for human rights violations abroad, whether economic, social, cultural, or civil and political rights. Corporate accountability is too often treated as the elephant in the room, but it must be front and center.

The second agenda is the we need to preserve the internet as a public sphere that furthers communication rights for everyone. Twenty years ago, the CRIS campaign (Communication Rights in the Information Society) argued that digital rights cannot just mean connectivity, which leaves people as fodder for corporate business models. Internet rights must enable meaningful communication. Today, this agenda has urgency because our epistemic rights—the ability to frame truth itself—are under threat in the algorithmic public sphere.

The third agenda addresses macroeconomic injustices and seeks a just international economic order based on the principle of digital non-alignment. Trade, taxation, and intellectual property regimes reinforce digital coloniality. These issues are often dismissed as “not WSIS issues” and deferred to other forums. But without acknowledging the macroeconomic policy context, we cannot build a just and equitable knowledge society. WSIS Action Lines on enabling environments must include this recognition.

And the final agenda is for a sustainable digital transition that safeguards the human rights of future generations and gender equality. We need to ensure a just and sustainable digital transition that protects the rights of future generations. At the same time, from the very beginning of WSIS, gender equality has not been meaningfully mainstreamed across Action Lines. This cannot wait any longer. The rights of women, girls, and gender minorities must be advanced in how digital society is unfolding, with dedicated commitments right now.

Susan: Returning to the question of civil society’s role in shaping the progressive agendas for digital justice, Sally Burch seemed to echo your sentiment about multistakeholder collaboration in contextualizing the significance of WSIS for civil society engagement, saying, “We no longer have the conditions that, in Geneva, in 2003, enabled such broad consensus among civil society representatives”. Given all this, what are some critical points for social movements and digital justice organizations to think about? What are some fault lines they need to overcome?  What new opportunities does the current situation present for progressive civil society?

Nandini: I think rather than look at it as overcoming fault lines, I feel that within, it’s the nature of civil society to be diverse. So, the plurality and diversity of positions should be leveraged as a strength. So, let us ensure that we participate actively, so these multiple positions are out there, and the dynamism is in the diversity.

At the same time, it may be possible to also work on a common agenda type of position, where we all have different nuances, but on the bottom line, we agree with this. And on the bottom line, of course, again and again, it will sound like a broken record now, the agenda remains: the accountability for human rights violations in the digital paradigm, the need to solve the institutional governance deficits in setting rules for internet-related public policy issues, including data and AI governance.

Susan: A few months ago, after the adoption of the Global Digital Compact, you and Anita Gurumurthy had laid out civil society strategies in the implementation of the GDC along three crucial agendas. Are there any additions to this playbook? You’ve mentioned various other crucial processes at this moment, apart from the WSIS processes and GDC implementation process, that are immensely significant, like the UN Tax Convention or the conference on Financing for Development. Are there any additions that you want to make to this playbook? What are other opportunities, avenues, forums, and discussions that you think progressive civil society organizations that are concerned about digital justice should be engaging in?

Nandini: When we start out as digital rights organizations, we tend to engage a lot with the WSIS process and GDC process and other processes we see as being of a ‘digital’ nature But what I feel that we need to do now is to expand our engagement into the multiple forums of traditional development policy which have intersections with data justice, such as trade, where we are actually preparing for a defensive battle than a progressive agenda-setting battle.

Of course, it’s not possible, when resources and bandwidth are limited for all of us in every organization, to be experts on everything. So, all of us in the digital rights space must invest in building cross-movement alliances in a particular context, and see how the digital agenda evolves and takes shape within other conversations.

This is nothing exceptional – it has been faced by movements dealing with cross-cutting, horizontal issues such as the feminist or ecological justice movement. We know how to engage with that. We need to learn from history and move forward, which is the DNA of civil society action that is successful. And to make space for that, let’s begin by re-evaluating our multistakeholderism playbook.