Given the sheer pace of the news cycle in recent weeks, it seems difficult to believe that barely a month has passed since Donald Trump assumed the presidency. It has been a whirlwind of executive orders, high-handed threats about trade balances, internal crises in the US state apparatus, and stunning declarations of nakedly colonial design, amongst a host of other bewildering developments. Now, with challenges from the judiciary to contend with, it remains to be seen whether the checks and balances of liberal democracy can constrain this institutional disruption. However, when it comes to technology, particularly in relation to the international order, we are beginning to see the outlines of the agenda being unveiled.
From the unanimous fealty being pledged by tech CEOs to the billions set aside for investment in AI, to the renewed fortunes of an ailing cryptocurrency industry, it seems clear that Silicon Valley is a major part of Trump’s vision for re-asserting American dominance. To this end, there have been clear signals about how these interests are going to be secured on the global stage. As Vice President JD Vance made clear at the recent AI Action Summit in Paris, the situation is one of a race towards dominance. Regulation is perceived as a hindrance to this objective and will be met with open hostility and economic reprisals.
As Vice President JD Vance made clear at the recent AI Action Summit in Paris, the situation is one of a race towards dominance. Regulation is perceived as a hindrance to this objective and will be met with open hostility and economic reprisals.
Indeed, this is a significant shift in tone from recent multilateral declarations on the need for robust AI guardrails, and stronger commitments towards digital governance more generally. It puts the US clearly at odds with the momentum of international cooperation as it currently stands. This was perfectly symbolized by the US refusing to participate in this year’s G20 talks to be held in South Africa. By doing so, it is sabotaging what many believe to be one of the few truly consequential forums of dialogue and global coordination that exist today. The subtext, thus, is that we are entering an era where the exertion of force will no longer be constrained, even by the thin veneer of diplomacy it has carried in the past.
How then, can we expect others to react? What of the many projects of digital sovereignty that have gained steam in recent years, across the EU and the global south? What of those who want to steer clear of being caught up in a new cold war? It is worth mapping some of this terrain to think these questions through.
Europe as collateral damage?
From the recommendations of the much-discussed ‘Draghi report’ to the many important regulations enacted in recent years, the EU’s push to bolster its own digital economy has been, by its own account, one of the linchpins in its strategy to counter its now decade-long economic stagnation. Yet, Trump’s agenda now poses an existential threat to such aspirations.
In fact, even before the inauguration of Trump’s presidency, Vance was already making threats of withdrawing NATO support if EU regulators went after the X platform. Since then, such bellicose rhetoric has become the norm in the US’s dealing with its allies.
In fact, even before the inauguration of Trump’s presidency, Vance was already making threats of withdrawing NATO support if EU regulators went after the X platform. Since then, such bellicose rhetoric has become the norm in the US’s dealing with its allies. Things had gotten to a point where Europe even floated reining in its crackdowns on Big Tech in a bid to appease Trump. However, seeing that this had little purchase, they are now scrambling to formulate a proper response. Some are calling for even stronger punitive measures against Silicon Valley, whilst the likes of President Emmanuel Macron have suggested diluting regulation to allow for domestic companies to grow bigger and more competitive.
The problem with such proposals is that they presume a capacity to be effective without a much more comprehensive reconfiguration of the EU’s economic and political situation. As astute analyses of its current malaise have shown, both Europe’s relative backwardness in the platform space, as well as its dependencies on the US, are structural. The product of decisions and policies that go back decades, and which weren’t revised when they needed to be. To truly address these issues will require sweeping changes, both internally and with respect to its external economic relations as well. This is precisely why, in the near term, the bloc remains vulnerable to the extractive dynamic that they are now being subjected to by their old ally. Being trapped in this position is likely to be politically volatile, and with the far-right already on the rise across the continent, things do not bode well.
The key question now is whether this degree of open subordination may finally push the EU to reconsider its unwavering dedication to American hegemony. Of course, given the various military covenants, a clear break is almost impossible to conceive.
The key question now is whether this degree of open subordination may finally push the EU to reconsider its unwavering dedication to American hegemony. Of course, given the various military covenants, a clear break is almost impossible to conceive. However, the EU still has the capacity to commit to modes of international cooperation that the US is all too eager to abandon, not least with regard to digital/AI governance. In doing so, the opportunity exists to help restore multilateral engagement to a genuine site for political negotiation, and for building solidarities and frameworks to mitigate the violent spasms of the US’s fraying grip on power.
Burgeoning Digital Ecosystems
Much as it has in the EU, the last decade has seen a growing awareness in the Global South about the digital paradigm and its far-reaching ramifications for the future of global capitalism and politics. As a result, ‘digital sovereignty’ has become a ubiquitous term in these parts of the world, with policymakers and governments actively trying to formulate their own entry points to what is widely perceived as a new industrial revolution.
To this end, a number of larger nations from the majority world have made a significant dent in building up their digital economies. Of course, China is a case in itself. But the remaining BRICS countries—along with a host of others—have also made some progress, as recent studies suggest. They have invested in building domestic capabilities and infrastructures, fostered competitive platforms, and enacted regulatory frameworks to mitigate the capture of local digital value chains by foreign actors. What’s more, as Dwayne Winseck pointed out several years ago, they have also begun to expand their presence in the ownership of the large-scale, material layer of the internet: under-sea cables, internet exchange points, data centers, and the like.
These middle-power nations do have some things working in their favor. As analysts have noted, their large populations make them potential goldmines for both new users and minable data, and as such, they represent some of the most prized markets for the biggest platform businesses.
While these achievements pale in comparison to the dominance of the US and China, these middle-power nations do have some things working in their favor. As analysts have noted, their large populations make them potential goldmines for both new users and minable data, and as such, they represent some of the most prized markets for the biggest platform businesses. Some have argued that this allows for some leverage vis-à-vis the competing hegemons, allowing nations to play them against each other in a bid for securing technology transfers, domestic investment, and eventually greater autonomy for themselves.
Indeed, even outside of this strategic context, the approach towards ‘Digital Public Goods’ has been a promising avenue, and countries like India and Brazil have seen considerable success in developing such infrastructures as a way to transform legacy government systems, or facilitate access to digital payments and finance.
Indeed, even outside of this strategic context, the approach towards ‘Digital Public Goods’ has been a promising avenue, and countries like India and Brazil have seen considerable success in developing such infrastructures as a way to transform legacy government systems, or facilitate access to digital payments and finance. These frameworks have the merit of being based on open-source software and protocols and have both been shared with other developing nations and championed at multilateral forums such as the G20.
That said, one should not over-dramatize the accomplishments presented here. From cloud servers to intellectual property, most of these countries still remain dependent on Big Tech in a number of ways. While they may seek to capitalize on their forms of leverage to eventually surmount these dependencies, they already have confronted significant push-back against such efforts and may face an even more aggressive US going forward. How difficult it will be to navigate these power balances remains to be seen.
Perhaps, however, the key question for the future of digitalization in the Global South is not how these emerging digital economies contend with US bullying. It is how these digital economies will relate to those around them.
The Rest of the Global South
A proper mapping of the state of the digital paradigm in the developing world must provide the full picture. In doing so, one also has to look at the vast majority of developing countries that are completely ill-equipped to engage meaningfully in any kind of digital transition. In fact, years of extractivism, political instability, and effectively neo-colonial relations of debt-bondage, have made many of them barely able to sustain any economic growth at all.
[The Global South is] integrated into these networks as the source of minerals or extremely cheap labor, and such relations continue into the digital age. It may now be lithium and cobalt instead of platinum and iron ore, but the same degree of economic subjugation is at play in their positioning within global value chains.
In these circumstances, they serve as a hinterland for the core networks of global capitalism. They are integrated into these networks as the source of minerals or extremely cheap labor, and such relations continue into the digital age. It may now be lithium and cobalt instead of platinum and iron ore, but the same degree of economic subjugation is at play in their positioning within global value chains.
What is worse, the economic hardship of recent years, coupled with the upheaval of the pandemic, has put the financial situation of these countries in dire straits. UNCTAD’s 2024 report on global public debt offers this harrowing statistical encapsulation:
Mired in these conditions, it is this part of the Global South that is most vulnerable to the ruthless, international order that Trump is bringing into being. With dysfunctional states and regional wars breaking out from Sudan and Syria, to the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti, the law of the jungle is now being openly courted as a legitimate means for ‘great powers’ to secure their interests. While many countries likely to be exploited for digital value chains are not in states as dismal as this, they will still be subject to the same kind of naked plunder.
A Dangerous Cross-Roads
This, then, is the schism that runs through the Global South and the key challenge for the future of digitalization in the periphery. As Kenzo Soares has shown, the dangerous temptation that presents itself here is for cynicism to prevail, and for South-South alliances to break down. The onset of ‘platform sub-imperialism’, as he coins it, denotes a dynamic where the more digitally-advanced middle-powers set themselves up as regional hegemons, and start exploiting the more underdeveloped countries in their vicinity.
The onset of ‘platform sub-imperialism’, as Kenzo Soares coins it, denotes a dynamic where the more digitally-advanced middle-powers set themselves up as regional hegemons, and start exploiting the more underdeveloped countries in their vicinity.
The central example that Soares provides is that of the iFood platform, which has capitalized on Brazil’s relatively advanced digital infrastructure and regulatory frameworks to dominate Latin America’s delivery market. In doing so, it is able to both monopolize the sector as well as relegate neighboring digital economies to providers of precarious labor and data streams. However, one could also provide examples of such activity at different levels of the digital value chain, such as Rusisa’s brutal occupation of parts of Ukriane’s critical minerals, or the attempt by an Indian billionaire to become the sole developer of 5G infrastructure in Ghana.
What is important in this analysis is that such regional hegemonies do not constitute a ‘multi-polar’ world. Instead, they are fully compatible with American or Chinese empires. Indeed, in the examples cited above, the relevant Brazilian and Indian enterprises are powered by investments and infrastructure from Big Tech, and Russia’s war effort itself is dependent on its trade relationship with China.
At least when it comes to the digital sphere, most of these southern nations cannot subvert US/Chinese dominance on their own. A genuine challenge would have to occur at the level of international governance itself, confronting the overarching frame of today’s situation as a cold war between superpowers, and pushing international cooperation to acknowledge and address the vast inequalities and local crises that the digital economy has a bearing upon. By simply adhering to national interests, and preying on those economically more vulnerable, the more advanced countries in the south will have implicitly adopted the cynical ideology of American imperialism that Trump is advocating. In doing so, they will ultimately remain dependent proxies through which the likes of the US and China will seek to settle their differences.
A Different Vision of the Present?
While there are many forces pushing in the direction of a catastrophic breakdown in solidarity, the countries of the Global South also have the opportunity to forge an alternative path. One that draws on their own shared history of anti-colonialism. Cedric Durand has recently called for a ‘non-aligned digital policy’ as a potential orientation for those seeking to challenge the status quo. The logic behind this call gets to the core of the issue. It shows today’s geo-political common sense for what it is: a false conflict that is rooted in the delusions of grandeur and internal tensions of American society. One that risks jeopardizing the entire history of international cooperation and human rights in the pursuit of some lost sense of pre-eminence.
The Global South could play a pioneering role in such an overturning of the dominant narrative of digital policy today. Yet, doing so would require surmounting the calculus of self-interest, and committing to a radical revaluation of our collective, global priorities and the place of digital technology within them.
Rather than trying to adopt or recreate the rentierist platform businesses of Big Tech, is it possible to conceive of new forms for digital technology’s interface with our societies and economies?
Rather than trying to adopt or recreate the rentierist platform businesses of Big Tech, is it possible to conceive of new forms for digital technology’s interface with our societies and economies? Forms that are receptive to the needs of people and the planet, and that value the ends of care, justice, and autonomy over those of capitalist accumulation? Within such an alternative conception of the present historical moment, these are the problems that would become salient.
The same holds for the current frenzy around AI. As Evgeny Morozov has forcefully argued, it is absurd for different companies, nations, and strategic blocs to invest trillions competing with each other, largely to build the same compute infrastructures and data servers to build essentially the same kind of AI models, with the same kind of capabilities. It would be akin to investing in the construction of competing internets, an undertaking of unthinkably exorbitant waste. Instead, models of public, democratically governed, and commons-based technological development could achieve the same results without wreaking havoc on the environment, and freeing up surplus financial resources for the upliftment of millions.
One may object that some of these possibilities appear utopian, especially given the virulent strains of politics that are circulating today. However, one should remember Slavoj Zizek’s now familiar maxim that the most utopian notion is that things can go on just as they are. To avoid catastrophe, a different vision is simply what is necessary.
